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ABSTRACT: One of the theoretical tensions that has arisen from Anthropocene
studies is what Dipesh Chakrabarty has called the ‘two figures of the human’, and
the question of which of these two figures of the human inheres in the concept of
the Anthropocene more. On the one hand, the Human is conceived as the uni-
versal reasoning subject upon whom political rights and equality are based, and
on the other hand, humankind is the collection of all individuals of our species,
with all of the inequalities, differences, and variability inherent in any species
category. This chapter takes up Deborah Coen’s argument that Chakrabarty’s
claim of the ‘incommensurability’ of these two figures of the human ignores the
way both were constructed within debates over how to relate local geophysical
specificities to theoretical generalities. This chapter examines two cases in the
history of science. The first is Martin Rudwick’s historical exploration of how
geologists slowly gained the ability to use fossils and highly local stratigraphic
surveys to reconstruct the history of the Earth in deep time, rather than resort to
speculative cosmological theory. The second is Coen’s own history of imperial,
Austrian climate science, a case where early nineteenth-century assumptions
about the capriciousness of the weather gave way to theories of climate informed
by thermodynamics and large-scale data […]
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Scaling fromWeather to Climate
DANIEL LIU
The interaction of all meteorological elements at a particular
time in a particular place provides what we call the ‘weather’
[Wetter]. The weather is not an average atmospheric state, but
rather the total impression or total effect of actually occurring
atmospheric phenomena all at once within a particular, short
period of time, at a certain hour, or even more strictly in a given
moment.We speak of theweather of a certain day, but only of the
‘climate’ [Witterung] and hardly of the ‘weather’ of a whole year,
because the longer theperiod, themoremanifold andheterogen-
ous are the weather phenomena that have occurred, which can
be summarized only through the term ‘climate.’ Climate already
indicates an abstraction, while weather is a real condition, an
individual event singled out of the changing sequence of climate
phenomena. A weather map shows the atmospheric phenom-
ena taking place over a part of the earth’s surface at a particular
moment. There is no such thing as a weather map for months
or a whole year, because the interplay of average temperature,
average cloud cover, average wind, average rainfall, or monthly
rainfall is not the weather.
Julius Hann, Lehrbuch der Meteorologie (1901), p. 483
The theme ‘weathering’ in this volume assumes a set of climatic forces
— both material and metaphorical — that act with some constancy
or predictability on an object, as well as specifying the kind or kinds
of temporalities with regard to the thing being weathered. One of our
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motivations for choosing ‘weathering’ as our theme is the clear and
distinct ambiguity of the concept. In English, at least, the concepts
‘weather’ and ‘weathered/weathering’ are at once global and local,
e.g., the way a thunderstorm is a locally contained event caused by
larger-scale climatological patterns; they invoke recent events, histor-
ical disruptions across a handful of centuries, and even processes that
stretch well into Earth’s deep history. The weathering or weathering
awayof anobject is temporally relative toboth theobject and the forces
acting upon it. Weather is also an omnipresent condition — there’s
good weather and bad weather, but there’s never no weather — and
yet, from within the ivory tower, it’s both containable and temporarily
escapable thanks to durable construction methods and modern cli-
mate control technologies like fibreglass insulation, air conditioning, a
steady supply of electricity, central heating, and cognitive dissonance.1
As a friendly concept, weathering manages to tick all of the boxes of
being everywhere and not everywhere at the same time, working as a
capacious-enough concept that’s both helpfullymeaningful and vague,
impossible to ignore and (as aforementioned) conveniently ignorable
if need be.
Are all of these possible meanings of the weather actually com-
mensurable with one another? Or is part of the appeal their incom-
mensurability? One of the more powerful intellectual currents within
Anthropocene discourse and the environmental humanities is a stress
on incommensurability of individual thinkers or political actors when
compared to the geographical, geological, and historical scales of an-
thropogenic climate change.The problem of scaling individual experi-
ence — be it through pragmatic experience, social contract theory,
the Kantian a priori, the Cartesian criterion of clarity and distinctness,
etc. — up to encompass the scale and nature of climate change has
been a manifest political problem around global climate science since
themid-1980s, and has dramatically intensified since the early 2000s.2
1 Christina Sharpe, In theWake: OnBlackness and Being (Durham,NC:DukeUniversity
Press, 2016), chapter 4; on air conditioning see Bruno Latour, Facing Gaia: Eight
Lectures on the New Climatic Regime, trans. by Catherine Porter (Cambridge: Polity,
2017), pp. 123–24.
2 Naomi Oreskes and Erik M. Conway,Merchants of Doubt: How a Handful of Scientists
Obscured the Truth on Issues from Tobacco Smoke to Global Warming (New York:
Bloomsbury, 2010).
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A running exchange with Dipesh Chakrabarty, Julia Adeney Thomas,
Robert Stockhammer is a good case in point. In 2009, Chakrabarty
reflected that his own scholarship left him ill-equipped to conceptually
tackle the political crises of global climate change:
I realized that all my readings in theories of globalization,
Marxist analysis of capital, subaltern studies, and postcolonial
criticism over the last twenty-five years, while enormously
useful in studying globalization, had not really prepared me
for making sense of this planetary conjuncture within which
humanity finds itself today.3
In 2012, Chakrabarty sensed that the problem of scale was becom-
ing more acute within postcolonial historiography and theory, which
has emphasized differences of cultural experience juxtaposed against
processes of globalization. The sheer scale of climate change left ‘ex-
perience’ behind, in that, ‘We cannot ever experience ourselves as
a geophysical force — though we now know that this is one of the
modes of our collective existence. We cannot send somebody out to
experience in an unmediatedmanner this “force” on our behalf.’4More
troublingly for Chakrabarty,
We now also have a mode of existence in which we […] are
‘indifferent’ or ‘neutral’ to questions of intrahuman justice
[…].This is why the need arises to view the human simultan-
eously on contradictory registers: as a geophysical force and as
a political agent, as a bearer of rights and as author of actions;
subject to both the stochastic forces of nature (being itself
one such force collectively) and open to the contingency of
individual human experience; belonging at once to differently
scaled histories of the planet, of life and species, and of human
societies.5
Even though the individual versus the generalwill has longbeen a stock
problem in social contract theory, Stockhammer, following Chakra-
barty’s lead, has noted that global climate change in the last century
3 Dipesh Chakrabarty, ‘The Climate of History: Four Theses’, Critical Inquiry, 35.2
(Winter 2009), pp. 197–222 (p. 199) <https://doi.org/10.1086/596640>.
4 Dipesh Chakrabarty, ‘Postcolonial Studies and the Challenge of Climate Change’,New
Literary History, 43.1 (2012), pp. 1–18 (p. 12) <https://doi.org/10.1353/nlh.2012.
0007>.
5 Ibid., p. 15, emphasis added.
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has created or intensified a fissure in the history ofWestern philosophy
that had remained hidden: the two separate concepts of humanity, the
rational homo of the philosophers and the speciesAnthropos of natural
history. Whereas homo gestures to the universality of human reason
and experience, the Anthropos signifies what is collectively common
despite human diversity and inequality. This distinction leads Stock-
hammer to write, ‘I am skeptical whether this model of individual
enlightenment [Homo] can directly carry over to seven billion spe-
cimens of the species [Anthropos]’, and, ‘The commonality of homo
is not comparable to the inequality within the Anthropoi.’6 Picking
up on Stockhammer’s terminology and highlighting the contradictory
or even ‘incommensurable’ concepts of the human, Chakrabarty re-
sponds,
By introducing new questions of scale— astronomical scales
for space, geological scales for time, and scales of evolutionary
time for the history of life—all in search of understanding the
relationship between the history of the planet’s atmosphere
and its life-carrying capacity, and thus promoting what may
be called a life, or zoecentric, view of the history of the planet,
the literature on global warming works at a tangent to the
completely homocentric narrative of globalization.7
Not that either Chakrabarty or Thomas believe this incommensur-
ability is only a hindrance. Thomas argues that just as paleobiology,
microbiology, and biochemistry ‘produce visions of “the human” that
are incommensurable with one another, as well as with the historian’s
usual conception of personhood and society’, for historians such in-
6 Robert Stockhammer, ‘Philology in the Anthropocene’, inMeteorologies of Modernity:
Weather andClimateDiscourses in the Anthropocene, ed. by Sarah Fekadu,Hanna Straß-
Senol, and Tobias Döring (= REAL: Yearbook of Research in English and American
Literature, 33 (Tübingen: Narr Francke Attempto, 2017)), pp. 43–64 (pp. 49–50).
7 Dipesh Chakrabarty, ‘The Human Condition in the Anthropocene’, in The Tanner
Lectures on Human Values, 35, ed. by Mark Matheson (Salt Lake City: University of
Utah Press, 2016), pp. 139–88 (p. 159), available online: <https://tannerlectures.
utah.edu/Chakrabarty%20manuscript.pdf> [accessed 1 August 2020]. Chakrabarty
replaces Stockhammer’s term Anthropos with his quasi-Aristotelian zoe to come up
with ‘zoecentric’ history.’ On ‘human agency over multiple and incommensurable
scales’ see Chakrabarty, ‘Postcolonial Studies and the Challenge of Climate Change’,
p. 1.
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commensurability and diversity are usually strengths, or at least are
tolerated well enough.8
The historian of science Deborah Coen offers a different take on
such ‘incommensurability’, that scaling, as well as awareness of scale
effects, are themselves human concepts, and that the point at which
different scales become ‘incommensurable’ is not fixed:
The spatial and temporal dimensions of human life are histor-
ically and culturally contingent: they vary with differences in
life span, degree of mobility, communications technologies,
and cultures of remembering the dead. There is therefore no
fixedmeaning to the ‘human scale’ that could be set in oppos-
ition to ‘the planetary’.9
In other words: How did we get to the point where individual experi-
ence, never mind community or even species experience, is assumed
to be so small, while conceptions of either regional environments
or planetary climates are assumed to be so large?10 The problem is
perhaps analogous, in early twenty-first-century political discourse, to
the way the individual’s experience has become politically and epis-
temologically unassailable against prevailing or ‘dominant’ narratives,
especially when dealing with the experiences of those who aremargin-
alized, forgotten, or historically oppressed. In both, the relationship
between the general and the particular becomes undone, either by
accident or through acts of deliberate resistance.11 Thequestion is not
so much one of whether all grand narratives and generalities need to
be done away with, but which generalities are now most useful, and
how the contours of general theories are negotiated. As Coen writes,
paraphrasing the nineteenth-century Austrian writer, Adalbert Stifter
(1805–1868): ‘In nature, as in human life […] often the little things
8 Julia Adeney Thomas, ‘History and Biology in the Anthropocene: Problems of Scale,
Problems of Value’, American Historical Review, 119.5 (December 2014), pp. 1587–
1607 <https://doi.org/10.1093/ahr/119.5.1587>.
9 Deborah R. Coen, ‘Big Is aThing of the Past: Climate Change andMethodology in the
History of Ideas’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 77.2 (April 2016), pp. 305–21 (p. 308)
<https://doi.org/10.1353/jhi.2016.0019>.
10 On the concept of regional, as opposed to local and national scales, see Jeremy Vetter,
Field Life: Science in the American West During the Railroad Era (Pittsburgh, PA:
University of Pittsburgh Press, 2016).
11 Ibid., pp. 62–63.
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are most significant, once they are recognized as instances of a more
general pattern, perceptible to observers everywhere.’12
The concepts Homo, Anthropos, the human, and the Anthropo-
cene are not only abstractions, but extrapolations from a highly spe-
cific set of scientific and social scientific practices, and we need to
pay attention to how these extrapolations are made. Likewise, rigor-
ous conceptions of the weather and weathering demand more than
just conceptual gesturing or figuration: it requires paying attention
to the methods by which particular phenomena, experienced at the
individual or immediately local scales, are stitched together to create
accurate pictures of regional and ultimately global conditions. If we
take ‘weather’ in its most everyday sense, then we ordinarily say it is
the job of the weather reporter or meteorologist to take into account a
wide range of regional patterns and information coming from a variety
of well-placed sensors in order to generate a weather report, an an-
ticipation of how much rain, wind, dryness, or thunderstorms I can
expect in a given place. In this volume, by focusing on weather and
weathering, we are re-examining how we transform a single weather
event or the weathering of a single object into broader notions respect-
ively of climate or maintenance. In contrast to the way Stockhammer’s
figurativeHomo and Anthropos are simply assumed to be universal, the
basic constructivist approach to the history and sociology of science
demands that we explain empirically how scientific concepts become
universal. There are, of course, a great many ways of doing so within
science studies, but in this essay, I will assume that this ‘how’ demands
examination of practices andmethodologies. As the editors of a recent
special journal issue on ‘Experiencing the Global Environment’ have
written, ‘Ways of experiencing the global[…]are by necessity always
produced locally.’13
The remainder of this essay will examine two areas of scholarship
in the history of sciences of scaling: Martin Rudwick’s foundational
work on the history of geology and Deborah Coen’s recent study of
12 Deborah R. Coen, Climate in Motion: Science, Empire, and the Problem of Scale
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2018), p. 154.
13 Lino Camprubí and Philipp Lehmann, ‘The Scales of Experience: Introduction to the
Special Issue Experiencing the Global Environment’, Studies in History and Philosophy
of Science Part A, 70 (August 2018), pp. 1–5 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2018.
05.003>.
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the origins of physical geography and climatology. These two cases
provide important contrasts, illuminating the differences between nat-
ural philosophy and natural history, theory versus empirical research.
Rudwick has argued that the major theoretical innovation that estab-
lished modern geology was the shift from a relatively rigid style of
ahistorical and deterministic geotheory to a geoscience that is highly
attentive to historical contingencies of time and place. In other words,
geologists had to learn how to scale up from local particularities and
contingencies to reconstruct the history of the earth. Coen, by con-
trast, argues that modern climate science developed in the reverse
fashion, from the active attempt to collect and synthesize local dif-
ferences into physical theories of climatic change, effective at regional
and global scales. How does this relate to the volume’s overall theme
of weather/weathering? Obviously, in the case of climatography, ob-
servation and recording of the weather at special observatories and
stationswas the new science’s empirical foundation. In the case of early
geology, scientists (Rudwick prefers the period-appropriate savants)
travelled looking for placeswhere theweather hadworn away theEarth
in a way that allowed one to see layers of different rocks or strata.
Both sciences deal with the earth as a physical system, both sciences
are clearly borne out by quite particular local human efforts, and both
sciences were fundamental in the late twentieth-century formulation
of the concept of the Anthropocene.
GEOLOGY: ENLIGHTENMENT IN ACTION
The evolutionary theorist and historian of science Stephen Jay Gould
(1941–2002) wrote in 1988 that Sigmund Freud had forgotten the
fourth great intellectual revolution of European scientific modernity.
Freud had enumerated three: Copernicus’ de-centring of the Earth
into one of a multitude of planets, Darwin’s demotion of man’s special
creation into the spectrum of the descent of species, and of course
Freud’s own revolution of subordinating rational action to the im-
pulses of the subconscious.The fourth revolution, which Freudmissed
and Gould insisted upon, was the early nineteenth-century discovery
of geological and cosmological deep time, the extension of the his-
tory of nature to millions and billions of years, in both breadth and
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depth.14 But it has been Martin Rudwick’s contention since his 2005
book Bursting the Limits of Time and emphasized in the 2008 sequel
Worlds Before Adam that geology’s essential modernity is not in its
mere extension of time, a concept other sciences have potentially en-
tertained. Rather, Rudwick argues that modern geology embraced a
very particular kindof historicity and temporality unique to the history
of the geosciences. Modern geology for Rudwick — perhaps mod-
ernity generally — is characterized by emphasis on the contingency of
geohistory, not just its depth. Contingency in the history of nature
means, to Rudwick, that the history of nature is ‘as unrepeated, and
as unpredictable, as human history itself ’.15 Modern geological theory
that embraces this sense of deep historical contingency can help take
local and regional rock formations and reconstruct the past in stepwise
fashion. By analogy, this is akin to comparing the reconstruction of
the evolutionary history of Homo sapiens to theories of the state of
nature in moral philosophy: these clearly related endeavours to under-
stand the human and the subsequent history of humanity nevertheless
have totally different relationships to the distant and proximate past.
This sense of historical contingency is, Rudwick argues, the product
of the late eighteenth-century habit by natural philosophers to import
methodological concepts from the history of Christian theology, spe-
cifically Biblical chronology, into the theories of the Earth. Without
denying the importance of deep time, Rudwick’s contention is par-
ticularly useful in our general consideration of weather/weathering,
in that it insists on the duality of the contingency of particular events
alongside the universality of the laws that govern them.
It is perhaps easier to understand what this contingent histor-
icity is by contrasting it with the alternative temporalities that have
been extant in European intellectual history. It is also a helpful way of
qualifyingwhatRudwickmeans by history being unrepeatable and un-
predictable: to be more exact, this means that a genuinely contingent
human history or history of nature must be directionally cumulative
14 Stephen Jay Gould, Time’s Arrow, Time’s Cycle: Myth and Metaphor in the Discovery of
Geological Time (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988), pp. 1–2.
15 Martin J. S. Rudwick,Bursting the Limits of Time:TheReconstruction ofGeohistory in the
Age of Revolution (Chicago:University ofChicagoPress, 2005), p. 6. See alsoRudwick,
Worlds Before Adam: The Reconstruction of Geohistory in the Age of Reform (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2008).
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(and therefore unrepeatable), and it also must not be preordained.
For the most part, ancient Greek and Roman natural philosophy only
provided its Latinate and Arabic descendants with a conception of
nature as eternal, cyclical, and governed by forces that acted out of ne-
cessity. This was particularly true in Platonic cosmology, Aristotelian
cosmology, and Ptolemaic astronomy, which took the eternal rotation
of the stars around the earth, and the evident perfection of circles and
spheres as the archetypes for both nature and causality generally. This
kind of natural philosophy stood in stark contrast with the emphasis
on free will in Christian theology and the Biblical drama of salvation.
One of the great tasks of European and Arab scholarship through the
MiddleAgeswas precisely to findways to reconcileGreekphilosophy’s
emphasis on the eternal on the one hand, and, on the other hand, Mo-
saic theology’s emphasis on both the provisional nature of God’s will
and the voluntary nature of human faith. The histrionics surrounding
the papal Condemnations of 1277 was but one famous episode, with
church authorities alarmed by the radical Aristotelians’ claims that an
eternal universe was more logically consistent than the account of cre-
ation in Genesis.16
Additionally, the Aristotelian foundations of medieval Latin and
Arabic natural philosophy provided only very crude ideas for under-
standing different scales of natural phenomena. Privileging the eternal,
circular motion of the celestial sphere relegated the terrestrial as the
realm of linear, or ‘accidental’ as opposed to perfectly circular and
eternal ‘natural’ motion. The physics of the terrestrial sphere were
effectively governed by the natural motions of the four elements in Ar-
istotelian matter theory— i.e., that earth, water, air, and fire tended to
sort themselves in layers, with earth ‘falling’ to the centre of the cosmos
and fire rising to the interface of air and the celestial aether (e.g. in pre-
Newtonian definitions of gravity). In this cosmology, the elements’
terrestrial disorder meant this overarching, law-like tendency towards
order would be interrupted by the proliferation of local events and
causes. The terrestrial as the realm of the accidental proved to be
a source of inspiration for natural philosophers seeking to reconcile
16 David C. Lindberg,TheBeginnings ofWestern Science, 2nd edn (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2007), chapter 10.
102 SCALING FROM WEATHER TO CLIMATE
the overarching eternalist framework of Greek metaphysics with the
demand for theological contingency: for example, for the Lutheran re-
former andpedagoguePhillipMelanchthon (1497–1560), elucidating
the providential meaning of accidents (generally, in the metaphysical
sense) was an essential way of fitting the Aristotelian natural philo-
sophical corpus into reformed Christianity based on justification by
faith alone.17
The terrestrial was therefore not historical so much as merely ac-
cidental, and terrestrial natural history was thus merely the corrupted
subset of a naturally eternal cosmos. At least when it came to nature,
Greek natural philosophy and its descendants up to the Scientific Re-
volution could explain specific natural phenomena with reference to
extremely local causes and agents (e.g., in theories of vision),18 but
they were not capable of wholesale discovery, ordering, and recon-
struction of events in time, deep or otherwise, according to Rudwick.
In contrast, Biblical chronology, dynastic chronicles, epics, and narra-
tives generally place events in a temporal sequence and seek to explain
their sequence with any number of causes. Nor did this lack of in-
terest in specific historical sequence substantially change during the
Scientific Revolution. The introduction of the new mechanical philo-
sophy by Descartes and the neo-Epicurean atomists in the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries managed to replace the eternalism of Ar-
istotelian cosmology with a linear history of the universe, albeit one
strongly shot throughwith determinism.Themechanical philosophy’s
determinism was directional— linear motion was now ‘natural’, while
active intervention was required for circular motion — but although
it could in principle be used to reconstruct the history of the uni-
verse, in practice the mechanical philosophy’s explicitly abbreviated
causality limited scientists to ad hoc guesses about particular types of
geological events. These ad hoc ‘theories of the earth’ traced their lin-
eage to Descartes own theory of the creation of mountains in his 1644
Principia Philosophiæ (part 4, sections 41–44), inwhichDescartes sug-
gested mountains were caused by differential heating and cooling of
17 Sachiko Kusukawa,The Transformation of Natural Philosophy: The Case of Philip Mel-
anchthon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
18 David C. Lindberg, Theories of Vision from Al-Kindi to Kepler, rev. edn (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press 1996).
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the Earth by the Sun (Fig. 1). This kind of directional, if broadly de-
terministic theory culminated in Buffon’s theory of the cooling earth:
in his Histoire Naturelle (1749–89), he argued that all of the planets
formed when comets struck the Sun, tearing off lumps of superheated
material that cooled as over time. Inspired by the evident fact that
mines become hotter the deeper they are excavated, Buffon went as
far as commissioning a blacksmith to heat iron balls of different sizes,
and studied the way heat loss varied by the size of the sphere: based on
these studies, Buffon argued in print that the Earth was approximately
75,000 years old, though in private he speculated that it was as high as
10million.19Whatever theparticular ageof theEarthmight be in these
theories, however, they were largely based on a premise that a small
set of initial conditions and mechanisms could account for the entire
course of geohistorical events in a deterministic, predictable fashion,
‘from Fireball to Snowball, under the constant laws of nature.’20 They
were, by definition, global in scope, albeit ‘global’ relative to cosmo-
logy, rather than relative to anything approaching human history of
human experience. This indoor theorizing was often dismissed as in-
dulgent speculation.Nevertheless, these kinds of ‘Fireball to Snowball’
theories by Buffon and others provided for a deeper history of the
Earth, now conceivably millions of years old.
They also created the first tentative link between theories of
the Earth’s development with a different domain of investigation:
geognosy, what today wemight call stratigraphy, the description of the
ordering of layers of different kinds of rocks into strata (Figure 2). In
the eighteenth century and earlier, geognosy was a descriptive part of
the sciences of mining and quarrying: layers of rock were studied in
order to anticipate where in the Earth valuable ores or minerals could
be found. In most areas, the layers of rock formed regular sequences
from topsoil down to bedrock granite: mine engineers knew that these
sequences of strata were fairly regular across local and even regional
distances, since they had already dug into the earth or examined ex-
posed outcrops.21 The clearly layered and seemingly orderly sequence
19 Martin J. S. Rudwick, Earth’s Deep History: How It Was Discovered andWhy It Matters
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014), pp. 65–66.
20 Ibid.
21 Rudwick, Bursting the Limits of Time, chapters 2 and 4.
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Figure 1. Descartes’ ‘buckling crust’ theory of the Earth, from Principia
Philosophiæ (1644). The surface crust of the Earth (E) has pores or
cracks (1–7) that connect the atmosphere (B) and F, a layer of rarefied
matter beneath the Earth’s crust; when the sun heats the Earth, heated
fragments of F push themselves up through the crust E, but then cooled
air B sinks through the pores of the Earth’s crust, expanding this body
and causing the crust to buckle upward. These buckles cause both the
formation of mountains and press the lower masses D and C upward,
causing the creation of oceans at fragments 2–3 and 6–7.
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of strata had made early geotheory plausible, and early geotheory like-
wise tried to mobilize the regularity of rock strata to create theories of
the Earth. In what Rudwick calls the ‘standard model’ of pre-modern
geology, as the Earth cools, its surface becomes a giant ocean, and
further cooling causesminerals to precipitate and sediment into layers,
with each layer differing due to its relative age and by its chemical
composition.22 These theories could thus explain why ‘basement’ or
‘Primary’ rocks like granite, schist, gneiss, and marble were usually
found below the lighter, ‘Secondary’ rocks like sandstone, shale, and
limestone. Buffon’s and other theories following the standard model
could potentially take geognosy — ordinarily a descriptive, classifica-
tory, and structural science — and transform it into evidence of the
Earth’s deep history.
But the Earth is not so regular, and planetary-scale causal theor-
ies like the late eighteenth/early nineteenth-century standard model
struggled to account for the increasing amounts of local variationbeing
studied and recorded by miners, physical geographers, and mineralo-
gists. Critics of ‘Enlightenment rationality’ tend to miss the way that
amateur and expert savants in the eighteenth century also obsessively
collected examples of nature’s diversity, often desiring particularly
strange specimens that explicitly defied extant theories or rationaliza-
tionsof nature. Strangeor beautiful rocks and fossilswouldbe removed
from their original context precisely for their peculiar or exemplary
character and be placed in mineralogical collections; these collected
specimens could be compared by simple visual examination, through
more advanced optical analysis, or even through more destructive
chemical analysis. Chemical analysis could raise some uncomfortable
questions about the standard model. Why, for instance, was heavy
basalt so often found in strata on top of, for example, lighter sediment-
ary strata like sandstone or limestone? Did this mean basalt was a
compressed sandstone? Or, as some geotheorists in the eighteenth
century suggested, was basalt volcanic in origin — thus adding unex-
pected complexity to the standard model of geological history?23
22 Ibid., pp. 172–74.
23 Ibid., pp. 62–63.
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Figure 2. Angular unconformity at Praia do Telheiro, near Sagres in
Algarve Portugal. It shows Late Triassic red and yellow planar
sandstones resting on top of tilted black shales and greywackes of
Carboniferous age, deformed during the Variscan orogeny. Photograph
by André Cortesão, Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported license
<https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Angular_Unconformity_
at_Praia_do_Telheiro_in_Algarve_in_Portugal.png>.
Themost broadly synthetic method of addressing these questions
about the Earth’s geological diversity would, by themiddle of the nine-
teenth century, be found in physical geography and geognosy, which,
above all else, privileged outdoor fieldwork over the collection and
comparison of objects. The turn of the century in Europe witnessed a
unique boom in geological fieldwork, though the reasons for the boom
varied in different places: in Britain it became inexplicably fashionable
for leisured gentleman to explore their physical environments, while
in Central Europe minor and major states alike established mining
schools as a cameralistic response to the economic devastation of the
Seven Years’ War.24 Initially, both these amateur and professional en-
24 Ursula Klein,Humboldts Preussen: Wissenschaft und Technik im Aufbruch (Darmstadt:
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2015).
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deavours were much alike in scale but unlike in dimension. As already
mentioned, mining scientists in places like the Ore Mountains on the
border of Saxony and Bohemia sought to understand the local se-
quence of the Earth’s strata in order to anticipate where veins of ore
(and later coal) might be found before undertaking the costly work of
digging mine shafts. Mining savants above all, like Abraham Gottlob
Werner (1749–1817), thus sought to understand the sequence of
strata on the vertical axis in particular mining districts. Strata are not
simply layered in parallel sequences as the standard model — or, for
that matter, the Aristotelian model — would suggest, like a cake, but
rathermany sit at different angles.Certainwell-established strata could
be found in vastly different thicknesses in different places.Most critical
were unconformities, placeswhere some stratamight be layered at sharp
angles to others, or a stratum is highly uneven, or perhaps missing en-
tirely, or even found unexpectedly intruding on a predicted sequence.
Some unconformities are visibly evident, others quite subtle and vis-
ible only to someone looking for it; some strata simply do not show
clear orientation at all, looking more like a mass of rubble. These dif-
ficulties made expertise valuable particular in the professional setting
of mining and geognosy, but amateurs could nevertheless do the basic
work, since the basic instruments were quite minimal: all one needed
was a hammer, shovel, a hand lens, free time, and transportation to
seek out weathered cliff faces or hills with exposed layers of rock. At
the same time, longpersonal experiencewith the rocks of a local region
was necessary to understand all of the variation that was possible, and
to discriminate between similar-looking strata, in order to correlate the
sequence of formations from one place to another.25
Themining professionals had the advantage of being able to enlist
labour to dig, but they also considered their knowledge to be both
relatively localized and purely descriptive: initially, geognosy was not
tied to particular theories of the Earth or ideas about Earth’s history.
But over the course of the first half of the nineteenth century, as more
andmore local areas had their stratamapped, the early geologists grew
increasingly confident that they could understand the stratigraphy of
25 Martin J. S. Rudwick,TheGreat Devonian Controversy: The Shaping of Scientific Know-
ledge Among Gentlemanly Specialists (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), pp.
37–54.
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whole regions by induction, without needing to direct empirical evi-
dence from each individual locale. Moreover, the growing network
of amateurs in Britain meant that studies of local formations could
be compared: by 1822 the Geological Society of London counted
313 members living in or near London, and an additional 328 ‘non-
resident’ members living overseas, all of whom received published
Proceedings that summarizedmembers’ reports.26Theamateurs in Bri-
tain had the advantage of sheer numbers and a growing system of sci-
entific sociability that could coordinate the efforts of a larger numberof
less-expert local explorers.These collective efforts would culminate in
some of the most impressive examples of the synthesis of experiential
knowledge in natural history: George Bellas Greenough (1778–1885)
andWilliam Smith’s (1769–1839) grand geological maps of regions as
large as the entirety of England (Fig. 3), with Smith making his map
entirely through his own surveying work. Bymid-century, British geo-
logists were crisscrossing the globe, taking advantage of global travel
secured by Britain’s naval supremacy, in order to conduct intensive
geological surveys in the field.The Scottish geologist RoderickMurch-
ison (1792–1871) made expeditions to nearly every corner of the
globe, from Australia to British-controlled India to the Russian Baltic:
his work in stitching together the stratigraphy of so many areas of the
Earth was not only in service of geological theory, e.g. determining
the global distribution of the sequence of strata, but equally import-
antly his work aided imperial and colonial authorities in planning gold,
coal, and other mining projects that ultimately sustained the imperial
endeavour. At every point in Murchison’s journey, the basic tools of
investigation were the same: travel to many locations, examine extant
outcroppings, map and chart formations along horizontal and vertical
axes.27
Identifying and associating the order of strata across such large
distances ultimately required more than just the examination of the
rocks themselves, the differences among which could be exceedingly
subtle, or, in the case of some unconformities, absent entirely. The
great success of unlocking the sequence of strata across the globe owed
26 Ibid., pp. 18–27.
27 Robert A. Stafford, Scientist of Empire: Sir Roderick Murchison, Scientific Exploration,




Figure 3. Part of William Smith’s map of geological sections in Somerset,
England, 1819, showing the sedimentary strata of sandstone, marl, and
limestone. William Smith, Section of the Strata through Hampshire and
Wiltshire to Bath, on the Road from Bath to Salisbury (London: John
Cary, 1819).
much to the growing recognition in the nineteenth century that the
order of rock stratawere correlated to the kinds of fossils that geologists
and geognosists found in each of the strata. The distinctiveness of the
fossil bones, shells, and occasionally plants in each stratum became
aids for identifying the order of strata across regions where the rocks
themselves were not the same, or just hard to identify: Smith’s grand
maps of the strata of England owed much to his ability to use ‘char-
acteristic fossils’ to identify strata. But these observable consistencies
across strata and fossil beds eventually became a way to understand
both fossils and strata as clues for the reconstruction of a linear, pro-
gressive, and contingent history of the Earth. As early as 1801, the
naturalist Georges Cuvier (1769–1832) remarked, ‘the older the beds
in which these bones are found, the more they differ from those of
animals we know today.’28 As geologists and collectors alike started
to plot out where certain kinds of fossils were found — a task that
required experience both out in the field and inside the museum —
it became apparent that the top-most, ‘youngest’ strata bore fossils
that were similar tomany known living species, while fossils in deeper,
‘older’ strata were often much stranger. Whereas in the late eighteenth
century early geologists had suggested that the presumably law-like
character of geological change might make the history of the Earth
cyclical or eternal, the fossil evidence accumulating in the early nine-
28 GeorgesCuvier, ‘Espèces dequadrupèdes’ (1801), p. 260, quoted inRudwick,Bursting
the Limits of Time, p. 424.
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teenth century seemed to show otherwise. The fossils that were being
found were simply not like bones of known animals, suggesting that
large scale extinctions accompanied the successive deposition of rocks
into strata. Moreover, as the correlations of fossil types and strata be-
came stronger, it became possible to imagine a reconstruction of the
actual past world that these fossils came from. A most dramatic case
in 1822 by the English theologian and geologist William Buckland
(1784–1856) demonstrated that it was even possible to reimagine not
only ecosystems, but even the daily lives of animals that lived in a
very distant time.The cave, discovered byminers in 1821 working in a
limestone quarry in Kirkdale, in Yorkshire, was filled with fossil bones
of elephants, hyenas, rats, horses, bears, oxen, and rhinoceroses. Yet
both the entrance of the cave and the cave itself was too small for any of
these larger animals to go in. Buckland realized that the cavemust have
been home to a hyena den, and that the largest bones must have been
dragged into the cave by the hyenas, as shown by the toothmarks on
the large bones and abundant ‘calcareous excrement’ found within the
gravel and silt. The petrified dung would be the key to the reconstruc-
tion: by comparing the fossil excrement with specimens from English
zoos, Buckland demonstrated that the fossils were most likely dragged
in as scavenged food by the hyenas, and not washed into the cave —
either by periodic flooding or by Biblical deluge.29
Buckland’s reconstruction of the Kirkdale cave made it possible
to, as Rudwick puts it, ‘construct a conceptual time machine’ moving
backward from recent cases into the deep past.30This kind of stitching
together of the past from localized elements into maps and narratives
stood in stark contrast to earlier attempts to create theories starting
from cosmological scales. As Rudwick argues in Earth’s Deep History,
by the middle of the nineteenth century geology had adoptedmany of
its conceptual frameworks not fromgeophysics but rather from secular
and sacred history: the coins, artefacts, and documents of history and
historiography were made analogous to the rocks, fossils, and forma-
tions of geology. Although elements of this analogy can be debated,
it nevertheless suggests how modern geology can be considered as a
29 Ibid., chapter 8.
30 Rudwick, Earth’s Deep History, p. 125.
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science of scaling up localized, individualized experience into grand
narratives of the history of the Earth.
CLIMATOLOGY: FROM EXPERIENCE TO THEORY
The epigraph at the top of this chapter, taken from the meteoro-
logy textbook by theAustrian climatologist JuliusHann (1839–1921),
highlights the fundamental epistemological difference marked by the
concepts ‘weather’ and ‘climate’: we can go outside and experience the
weather throughour senses and instruments, but ifwe are to collect our
experience into knowledge about the climate, then we have to resort
to something other than experience. It does not follow that weather
is real and climate a fiction: it simply means that the two are grasped
by different means. The history of climatology and meteorology in
some sense runs in the opposite direction from the history of geology
and theories of the Earth. Whereas the latter began at cosmological
scales and gained local-historical granularity, the sciences of weather
and climate began with the assumption that local weather events were
both highly variable and highly place-specific. Climate science only
later acquired a theoretical generality that could tie large-scale move-
ments of air, water, and heat together with the particularities of a local
landscape.
Meteorology and weather forecasting have probably been prac-
ticed by every human society through some means, though the mod-
ern combination of ship-borne observation of navigable winds and
long-term records from weather stations to analyse large-scale cli-
matic phenomena began in the late-1700s, with the mobilization of
the thermometer, barometer, and hygrometer.31 Well into the nine-
teenth century, alerts for potentially catastrophic weather events re-
quired someone to directly observe an incoming storm — by ship in
many colonial coastal ports, by observation stations everywhere else.32
The historian Richard Grove has argued that the first global climatic
31 H. Howard Frisinger,TheHistory of Meteorology: To 1800 (New York: Science History
Publications, 1977).
32 See Robert M. Rouphail, ‘Cyclonic Ecology: Sugar, Cyclone Science, and the Limits
of Empire inMauritius and the Indian OceanWorld, 1870s–1930s’, Isis, 110.1 (March
2019), pp. 48–67 <https://doi.org/10.1086/702729>.
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event to be accurately recorded was probably the Great El Niño of
1790–1794, when the British imperial officials simultaneously recor-
ded barometric readings, droughts, and reports of crop failures in the
Caribbean, northern China, Australia, Mauritius, and most critically
Madras and Bengal.33 But noticing the simultaneity of far-flung events
doesnot amount tonoticing andnamingone climatic event: in the case
of the El Niño Southern Oscillation, a complete theory only emerged
in the 1960s, with major revisions made through the 1980s. Until the
1870s, the gathering of data and creation of meteorological maps and
tables had only a very limited theoretical payoff.34 As Deborah Coen
argues in Climate in Motion, taking climatology from rules of thumb
to scientific theories of global climate required new physical theories
of heat as well as literary techniques for describing movement across
scales.
For Coen, the Austro-Hungarian Empire was a political entity
that was particularly suited for the creation of an integrated science
of climatology: a contiguous land empire that encompassed many
peoples, languages, and terrains. Coen argues that finding political
unity in the Empire meant searching for the forces and tensions that
tied together the parts into the whole through dynamics, rather than
simply assuming parts are instantiations of an a prioriwhole or natural
category.35 Mapping and collecting, which were so crucial to British,
Dutch, and Spanish imperial projects, were augmented by projects to
determine why diversity persisted across an integrated space: it was
important to fully catalogue local contrasts, but an additional step was
needed to turn this collection of facts into scientific knowledge.36
In Austrian climatology, the additional force came through differ-
ent applications of thermodynamics in order to explain the accumu-
lation, movement, and dispersal of atmospheric energy. For example,
33 Mike Davis, Late Victorian Holocausts: El Niño Famines and the Making of the Third
World (London: Verso, 2002), pp. 216–18; Richard Grove and George Adamson, El
Niño in World History, Palgrave Studies in World Environmental History (London:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), chapter 4.
34 Azadeh Achbari and Frans van Lunteren, ‘Dutch Skies, Global Laws:The British Cre-
ation of “Buys Ballot’s Law”’,Historical Studies in the Natural Sciences, 46.1 (February
2016), pp. 1–43 <https://doi.org/10.1525/hsns.2016.46.1.1>.
35 Coen, Climate in Motion, p. 32.
36 Ibid., pp. 139–42, 153.
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theAustrian geographerAlexanderSupan(1847−1920)pioneered the
discovery and use of pressure and temperature gradients, mapped to
particular geographical regions, where atmospheric energy accumu-
lated and dispersed along predictable lines.37 Doing so revealed that
the distribution of climatic patterns was not itself driven by measured
wind speed, but rather by the movement the pressure systems that
drove the wind. But by far the most important climatological theory
to come out of imperial Austrian climate science was Max Margules’
(1856-1920) theory of the ‘available potential energy’ (APE) of the
atmosphere.38 Margules, a physicist at the Austrian Imperial Zent-
ralanstalt für Meteorologie und Geomagnetismus (ZAMG), argued that
the stability of pressure gradients themselves had to be accounted for
by measuring the energy capacity and (thermodynamic) work done
bymovingmasses of air andmoisture. By considering the dynamics of
weather as ‘pendulous oscillations’ of unequal masses of air as a first
principle (Fig. 4), Margules’ APE model implies that winds, storms,
and pressure gradients were caused by the movement of warm and
cold bodies of air — a concept that is fundamentally a mathematical
abstraction of direct experience — and that movement of warmer
or colder air horizontally across the landscape has significant effects
on the vertical distribution of atmospheric heat, pressure, and mois-
ture.39 Here was the grand unifying theory: all weather phenomena
must be understood as the energetic effect of bodies of air moving
across the land and up and down the atmosphere, and the terrain itself
thus has a powerful effect on the movement of these masses of air. In
the 1950s, the American meteorologist Edward Lorenz (1917–2008)
would broaden Margules’ theory of storm generation into a general
theory of atmospheric circulation, a theory that makes the movement
of heat into the root cause of all weather phenomena.40
37 Ibid., pp. 172–74.
38 Ibid., pp. 199–202.
39 Max Margules, ‘On the Energy of Storms’, inTheMechanics of the Earth’s Atmosphere,
trans. by Cleveland Abbe (Washington, DC: Smithsonian, 1910), pp. 533–95.
40 Edward N. Lorenz, ‘Available Potential Energy and the Maintenance of the General
Circulation’,Tellus 7.2 ( January 1955), pp. 157–67 <https://doi.org/10.3402/tellusa.
v7i2.8796>; EdwardN. Lorenz,TheNature andTheory of the General Circulation of the
Atmosphere (Geneva: World Meteorological Organization, 1967).
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Figure 4. Max Margules’ 1904 schematic showing an initial state (above)
of vertically differentiated temperature (Tn) and pressure (Pn)
differences (spatially divided by Ph), which results in the subsequent
state (below) of horizontally differentiated layers of air at different
temperatures and pressures. Max Margules, ‘On the Energy of Storms’, p.
536.
CONCLUSION
Experience, Lino Camprubí and Phillip Lehmann argue, scales.41
Models and theories of the climate are not generated solely by abstrac-
tion, but historically come from people observing rolling clouds near
and far, measuring the fall of atmospheric pressure, feeling their skin
becoming clammier as the humidity rises: the dynamic experience of
the weather is not only felt by one individual, but by many, and these
experiences and measurements are recorded, sorted, and eventually
calculated to become the science of the climate.This is in large part be-
cause there is not onemonolithic ‘experience’. Experience has different
modes of feeling and seeing that are augmented by time, technologies,
and, once accumulated, in expertise. The instruments and techniques
of experience in early geologywere collections, reports, and eventually
maps and guides to landscapes. The scale of geographical and geo-
logical maps provides a good case in point: they are clearly generated
by experience, but a map in the hands of its user becomes a tool to
41 Camprubí and Lehmann, ‘The Scales of Experience’.
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augment experience as well.The study of the cumulative and recursive
effect of experiences turned into tools and representations has become
one of the core tenets of empirical science studies in the twenty-first
century,42 despite the fact that such recursiveness can lead to a sense
of vertigo and disorientation.43
In this essay I have tried to juxtapose twodifferentways experience
and science scaled. In Rudwick’s studies of the history of geology,
theories of the Earth originate from the Aristotelian and Cartesian
theories operating at essentially cosmological scales, and much of
what makes geology ‘modern’ is its contrasting ability to account for
very small-scale, local variations of phenomena within the context of
planetary laws. Coen’s account of the history of climatography and
climatology, in contrast, begins with the historically widespread as-
sumption of the local, small-scale specificity and variability of the
weather, and only through the use of high-quality record keeping and
modelling using thermodynamic laws does a picture of climatological
dynamics arise. In both, the interplay of natural history and natural
philosophy is centre stage, and one does not operate well without the
other.
But what are we to make of the kinds of distant theorizing and
exploration of nature, which in both of the cases presented here is
conceptualized largely as a world prior to or absent the human species
— the Anthropos and the Homo mentioned at the start of the essay?
As Julia AdeneyThomas observes of Chakrabarty’s original analysis of
the concept of the Anthropocene, the challenge is not only in scaling
as such, which would be a problem of method and methodology in
the historical sciences, but in what is being scaled. For Thomas, the
distinction between Homo and Anthropos, or ‘the Human’ and ‘the
human species’
is not something humanist historians can understand through
self-reflection in Wilhelm Dilthey’s sense, where historical
consciousness is ‘a mode of self-knowledge’, or in R. G.
Collingwood’s sense, where historical comprehension rests
fundamentally not on reconstructing the past but on reen-
42 Bruno Latour, Pandora’s Hope: Essays on the Reality of Science Studies (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1999).
43 Coen, ‘Big Is aThing of the Past’, p. 309.
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acting ‘in our own minds the experience of the past.’ While
‘species’ may work for paleobiologists comparing, say, the
fossil records of Eemian biota from 130,000 years ago with
modern organisms, theirs is a labor of reconstruction as op-
posed to one of self-reflection or mental reenactment.44
I would like to close this meditation on weathering by suggesting
that this disjuncture Chakrabarty highlights between the human as a
political actor andhumanity as a planetary force is loosely analogous to
the distinction between the self-reflective subject and the self-negating
analyst. During the early-1990s debates on historical and scientific
objectivity, the historianThomas Haskell argued that attempts to cast
the concept of objectivity itself as both fictional and disingenuous ran
the risk of turning any historical scholarship into propaganda, and any
possible utterance into an expression of will:
But to shrug off the capacity for detachment as entirely il-
lusory — to claim that since none of the standpoints the
self is capable of imagining are really that of ‘the other’, but
are self-produced (as is certainly the case), and to argue that
all viewpoints therefore are indistinguishably contaminated
by selfishness or group interest or the omnipresent Nietz-
schean will — is to turn a blind eye to distinctions that all
of us routinely make and confidently act upon, and thereby
to blur all that distinguishes villainy from decency, veracity
from mendacity, in everyday affairs. Not to mince words, it is
to defame the species. Fairness and honesty are qualities we
can rightfully demand of human beings, and those qualities
require a very substantial measure of self-overcoming.45
Since these debates, historians of science have argued that objectivity
is itself a historically specific kind of subjectivity and set of values
that scientists work to cultivate, so much so that objectivity has it-
self become essentially synonymous with scientific knowledge and
practice.46 Haskell argues that the species — Stockhammer’s Homo
44 Thomas, ‘History and Biology in the Anthropocene’, p. 1592.
45 Thomas L. Haskell, ‘Objectivity Is Not Neutrality: Rhetoric Vs. Practice in Peter
Novick’sThat Noble Dream’,History andTheory, 29.2 (May 1990), pp. 129–57 <https:
//doi.org/10.2307/2505222>.
46 Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison, ‘The Image of Objectivity’, Representations, 40
(1992), pp. 81–128; Theodore M. Porter, ‘The Objective Self ’, Victorian Studies 50.4
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—must be capable of some kind or kinds of detachment, alienation,
impartial judgement, and empathy towards the other, and this itself
requires a degree of personal cultivation. It is precisely this recasting
and scaling-up of the personal experience of the weather to a global
understanding of climate, and the scaling-down of geological theory to
understand one’s local landscape or patch of the Earth, that demands
personal experience as well as alienation from it.
(2008), pp. 641–47; Jimena Canales, A Tenth of a Second: A History (Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 2009).
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